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Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

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  • Yuichi Yamamoto

Abstract

We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and/or the monitoring structure. Each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned. We show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a "belief-free" equilibrium. We also provide explicit equilibrium constructions in various economic examples. Copyright 2014, Oxford University Press.

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  • Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(1), pages 473-500.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:81:y:2014:i:1:p:473-500
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdt029
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    Cited by:

    1. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    2. Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020. "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    3. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    4. Heller, Yuval, 2017. "Instability of belief-free equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
    5. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2023. "Bad apples in symmetric repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.

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