Executive Control and Legislative Success
AbstractThe higher legislative success of parliamentary governments relative to presidential governments has been used to argue that legislative success is driven by parliamentary governments' superior agenda power or their control of legislative majorities. We show that this approach is at odds with some of the empirical regularities across and within political systems. We then propose a legislative bargaining model to elucidate this puzzle. In the model, the policies of a confidence-dependent parliamentary government enjoy more predictable support from governing coalition members because their short-term policy goals are less important than the government's survival. Coalition support is stronger when the government has more agenda power and is weaker with a larger ruling coalition. We explore the empirical implications of these findings and their consequences for the comparative study of legislative institutions. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 78 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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