The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
AbstractI study a principal-agent model in which the agent collects information and then chooses a verifiable action. I show that the principal can find it desirable to constrain the agent's action set even though there is no disagreement about the ranking of actions ex post. The elimination or penalization of "intermediate" actions, which are optimal when information is poor, improves incentives for information collection. I characterize optimal action sets when the agent is infinitely risk averse with respect to income shocks and optimal incentive schemes when the agent is risk neutral. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 72 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Dezsö SZALAY, 2003. "The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Dezsoe Szalay, 2004. "The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 233, Econometric Society.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Aggey Semenov, 2012. "Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent," Working Papers 1215E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
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