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Do freedom of information laws improve bureaucratic efficiency? An empirical investigation

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  • Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati
  • Arusha Cooray

Abstract

Previous studies find that adopting Freedom of Information (FOI) laws increase reporting of corruption, as this facilitates the right of access to governmental information. Thus, it is argued that FOI laws increase transparency and enhance government accountability. However, whether or not adopting such transparency laws improves bureaucratic efficiency remains unexplored. We provide first quantitative evidence on the impact of FOI laws on bureaucratic efficiency. Using panel data on 132 countries from 1990 to 2011, we find that adopting FOI laws, and in particular ‘stronger’ FOI laws, is associated with an improvement in bureaucratic efficiency, after controlling for self-section bias. FOI laws appear to be more effective in the long run, and if combined with a higher degree of media freedom, presence of non-governmental organization activism, and political competition. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity using instrumental variables, alternative samples, and estimation methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Arusha Cooray, 2016. "Do freedom of information laws improve bureaucratic efficiency? An empirical investigation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 968-993.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:68:y:2016:i:4:p:968-993.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpw008
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Salvatore Capasso & Rajeev K. Goel & James W. Saunoris, 2023. "The nexus between corruption and academic freedom: An international investigation of the underlying linkages," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(3), pages 513-531, July.
    2. De Luca, Giacomo & Lisi, Domenico & Martorana, Marco & Siciliani, Luigi, 2021. "Does higher Institutional Quality improve the Appropriateness of Healthcare Provision?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    3. Marenzi, Anna & Rizzi, Dino & Zanette, Michele & Zantomio, Francesca, 2023. "Regional institutional quality and territorial equity in LTC provision," The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Elsevier, vol. 26(C).
    4. Marenzi, A.; & Rizzi, D.; & Zanette, M.; & Zantomio, F.;, 2022. "Regional Institutional Quality and Territorial Equity in LTC Provision," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 22/27, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    5. Calogero Guccio & Domenico Lisi & Ilde Rizzo, 2019. "When the purchasing officer looks the other way: on the waste effects of debauched local environment in public works execution," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 205-236, September.
    6. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Arusha Cooray & Samuel Brazys, 2018. "Nothing to hide: Commitment to, compliance with, and impact of the special data dissemination standard," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 55-77, March.
    7. Changwony, Frederick Kibon & Paterson, Audrey S., 2019. "Accounting practice, fiscal decentralization and corruption," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(5).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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