Strategic licensing, exports, FDI, and host country welfare
AbstractThis paper analyses the preference of a foreign firm over serving a host country market and its impact on the host country welfare. We show that the foreign firm can choose licensing its superior technology to a host firm strategically which influences the foreign firm's subsequent preference over exporting and FDI. The effect on the host country welfare depends on the structure of license fee and it is shown that strategic licensing might lead to welfare loss for the host country. To this end this paper also prescribes either an optimal tariff scheme or a ban on licensing to maximize the host country welfare. Copyright 2010 Oxford University Press 2009 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 62 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Chang, Ray-Yun & Hwang, Hong & Peng, Cheng-Hau, 2013. "Technology licensing, R&D and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 396-399.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.