Natural Monopoly and Railway Policy in the Nineteenth Century
Abstract
Competition in the British railway system had burnt itself out by the end of the nineteenth century. Regression estimates of a cost fun ction based upon the 1865 railway returns are consistent with the ind ustry being a natural monopoly in which a number of firms were compet ing. The national railway system was not provided at the lowest cost. Analysis of two cross-national data sets implies the regulatory syst ems of other nations, which generally entailed monopolization and nat ionalization, generated lower railway capital costs than did that of the United Kingdom. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 39 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 699-718
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Bogart, Dan, 2010. "A global perspective on railway inefficiency and the rise of state ownership, 1880-1912," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 158-178, April.
- James Foreman-Peck & Leslie Hannah, 2012.
"Some Consequences of the Early Twentieth Century Divorce of Ownership from Control,"
Working Papers
0023, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
- James Foreman-Peck & Leslie Hannah, 2012. "Some Consequences of the Early Twentieth Century Divorce of Ownership from Control," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-864, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Numa, Guy, . "The Infrastructure-Superstructure Distinction in the Railroad Industry and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/4153, Université Paris-Dauphine.
- Crafts, Nicholas, 2011.
"Explaining the first Industrial Revolution: two views,"
European Review of Economic History,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(01), pages 153-168, April.
- Crafts, Nicholas, 2010. "Explaining the First Industrial Revolution: Two Views," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 10, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
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