A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Volume (Year): 5 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00354960 is not listed on IDEAS
- Eric Hilt, 2006.
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- Hilt, Eric, 2006. "Incentives in Corporations: Evidence from the American Whaling Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 197-227, April.
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"Insiders, outsiders, and the adaptability of informal rules to ecological shocks,"
dp12-20, CRABE, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
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- Daniel Smith, 2014. "Heterogeneity and exchange: Safe-conducts in Medieval Spain," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 183-197, June.
- Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
- Benson, Bruce L. & Siddiqui, Zafar R., 2014. "Pashtunwali—Law for the lawless, defense for the stateless," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 108-120.
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- Adam Gifford, 2000. "The Bioeconomics of Cooperation," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 153-168, May.
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