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Unrecognized States: A Theory of Self-Determination and Foreign Influence

Author

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  • Kristy Buzard
  • Benjamin A.T. Graham
  • Ben Horne

Abstract

Unrecognized states are characterized by stagnant or crumbling economies and political instability, often serve as havens for illicit trade, and challenge the territorial sovereignty of recognized states. Their persistence is both intellectually puzzling and normatively problematic, but unrecognized statehood can be a remarkably stable outcome, persisting for decades. Our dynamic four-player model reveals that unrecognized statehood emerges as an equilibrium outcome when a patron state is willing and able to persistently invest resources to sustain it. We assess options available to actors in the international community who seek to impose their preferred outcomes in these disputes and find that, although sanctions are the most frequently employed, they can often lead to renewed conflict instead of the intended resolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristy Buzard & Benjamin A.T. Graham & Ben Horne, 2017. "Unrecognized States: A Theory of Self-Determination and Foreign Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 578-611.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:33:y:2017:i:3:p:578-611.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleorg/eww017
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    Cited by:

    1. R Joseph Huddleston, 2020. "Continuous recognition: A latent variable approach to measuring international sovereignty of self-determination movements," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(6), pages 789-800, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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