Common and Exclusive Agencies and Partial Delegation
AbstractWithin the context of common agency, the article examines separation and partial delegation. The first entails breaking the multiple-task agency into smaller single-task agencies, whereas the second allows principals to substitute some of their efforts for the agency's. With respect to the first alternative, it is shown that common agency can be sustained against separation by the presence of strong complements. For the second alternative, principals partially delegate their effort and retain the right to influence agency output at a later stage of the game. Although this tends to weaken agency incentives, principals may prefer this version of common agency than one under full delegation and may prefer it to an exclusive one. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
Volume (Year): 23 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.