Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation
AbstractPrevious investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates have looked only at elections held under plurality-rule electoral laws. This paper investigates such equilibria in multimember districts operating under various largest-remainders methods of proportional representation (PR). In principle, strategic voting imposes a limit on the number of viable lists under PR, just as it imposes a limit on the number of viable candidates under plurality rule, as noted long ago. The results proved here provide some formal underpinning for this idea and yield specific hypotheses, for each electoral system, concerning the maximum number of lists/candidates consistent with equilibrium levels of strategic voting. Our results also clarify the conditions under which these theoretical upper bounds on the number of lists/candidates are binding in practice. We use Colombian and Japanese electoral data to test the model's predictions. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Volume (Year): 12 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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- Carina Bischoff, 2013. "Electorally unstable by supply or demand?—an examination of the causes of electoral volatility in advanced industrial democracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 537-561, September.
- Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz & Gardeazabal, Javier, . "Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals," DFAEII Working Papers 2013;05, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
- Michael Herrmann, 2012. "Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law: an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 63-90, April.
- SLINKO, Arkadii & WHITE, Shaun, 2006. "On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation," Cahiers de recherche 2006-20, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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