A Framework for Thinking about the 'Discretion' in the Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction
AbstractThe mandatory/discretionary distinction that has been applied to 'as such' challenges in WTO disputes is the subject of a good deal of disagreement, both as to its scope and its continued applicability. In this piece, I put forward a framework for thinking about the kinds of discretion that may exist in a measure, focusing on two general categories of discretion and presenting a way to evaluate the 'degrees' of discretion based on these categories. This framework can be applied regardless of which view is taken on the proper role of the distinction. In addition, I offer some thoughts on the basis for the distinction between mandatory and discretionary measures and, taking into account the framework developed, on how the distinction should be applied. Oxford University Press 2011, all rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of International Economic Law.
Volume (Year): 14 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://www.jiel.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.