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Patterns Of Establishment Entry And State-Level Antitrust

Author

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  • Robert M. Feinberg
  • Thomas A. Husted

Abstract

A large literature examines patterns of firm entry and relocation in response to local demand and cost parameters. Economists have studied tax incentives and local business conditions as drivers of business location decisions as well. In this article, we extend this analysis to consider the extent to which firms view state-level antitrust activity in the United States as an indicator of an adverse business environment, which in turn reduces that state's rate of establishment entry. We find some evidence of this effect, especially for larger firms and for more controversial types of antitrust enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert M. Feinberg & Thomas A. Husted, 2011. "Patterns Of Establishment Entry And State-Level Antitrust," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(4), pages 813-823.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:7:y:2011:i:4:p:813-823.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhr013
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert M. Feinberg & Thomas A. Husted & Florian Szücs, 2015. "Does State Antitrust Enforcement Drive Establishment Exit?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 85-106.
    2. Robert M. Feinberg & Thomas A. Husted, 2013. "Do States Free Ride In Antitrust Enforcement?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 997-1001, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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