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The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox

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  • Barak Y. Orbach

Abstract

“Consumer welfare” is the only articulated goal of antitrust law in the United States. It became the governing standard following the 1978 publication of Robert Bork's The Antitrust Paradox. The consumer welfare standard has been instrumental to the implementation and enforcement of antitrust laws. Courts believe they understand this standard, although they do not bother to analyze it. Scholars hold various views about the desirable interpretations of the standard and they selectively use random judicial statements to substantiate opposite views. This article introduces the antitrust consumer welfare paradox: it shows that, under all present interpretations of the term “consumer welfare,” there are several sets of circumstances in which the application of antitrust laws may hurt consumers and reduce total social welfare. This article shows that, when Bork used the term “consumer welfare,” he obscured basic concepts in economics. This article clarifies that the antitrust methodology permits only surplus analysis and does not accommodate welfare analysis. It explains the conceptual differences between the terms “surplus” and “welfare” and the relevant implications. This article further explains the differences between two other competing standards—“consumer surplus” and “total surplus”—that presently serve as proposed interpretations for the term “consumer welfare.” Each interpretation has some limitations and the necessary analytical progress calls first for conceptual clarity. This article argues that whatever good ends the “consumer welfare” phrase may have once served, antitrust law should now lay it to rest.

Suggested Citation

  • Barak Y. Orbach, 2011. "The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 133-164.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:7:y:2011:i:1:p:133-164.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhq019
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laszlo Goerke, 2022. "Partisan competition authorities, Cournot‐oligopoly, and endogenous market structure," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(1), pages 238-270, July.
    2. A. Douglas Melamed & Nicolas Petit, 2019. "The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(4), pages 741-774, June.
    3. Laszlo Goerke, 2022. "Endogenous Market Structure and Partisan Competition Authorities," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202201, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    4. Zhiyong Liu & Yue Qiao, 2017. "Vertical Restraints, the Sylvania Case, and China’s Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(2), pages 193-215, September.
    5. Kathryn Milun, 2020. "Solar Commons: A “Commons Option” for the 21st Century," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3), pages 1023-1057, May.
    6. Dzmitry Bartalevich, 2016. "The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 267-283, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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