IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jcomle/v11y2015i3p579-615..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Loyalty Rebates After Intel: Time For The European Court Of Justice To Overrule Hoffman-La Roche

Author

Listed:
  • Damien Geradin

Abstract

In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commission that condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusive rebates and “naked restrictions.” This judgment, in which the GCEU considered that in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal, has been subject to many criticisms as it is not in line with the teachings of economics. This article discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that it is a great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace that application with a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many advantages and create greater coherence in the case law of the CJEU on unilateral pricing conduct.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Geradin, 2015. "Loyalty Rebates After Intel: Time For The European Court Of Justice To Overrule Hoffman-La Roche," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 579-615.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:11:y:2015:i:3:p:579-615.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhv023
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Bruttel, 2019. "Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(3), pages 575-593, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:11:y:2015:i:3:p:579-615.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jcle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.