The effect of labor market institutions and macroeconomic variables on aggregate unemployment in 1990–2019: Evidence from 22 European countries[The effect of government size on the unemployment rate]

This paper investigates the long-run effect of a wide set of labor market institutions (LMIs) and macroeconomic variables on aggregate unemployment for a panel of 22 European countries over the period 1990–2019. First-difference feasible generalized least squares model, Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors, two-step generalized method of moments estimation of the fixed effects, and fixed-effects regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are estimated. The results suggest that employment protection legislation, wage bargaining coordination and centralization, minimum wage, and immigration inflows are significantly and negatively associated with the aggregate unemployment rate. Conversely, union density, product market regulation (PMR), and tax wedge have a positive and significant correlation with unemployment rate. The impact of corporate tax rate and government size is mostly positive. Moreover, the interaction between LMIs does matter and may sometimes change the interpretation of some reforms taken in isolation. Stronger wage-setting institutions may offset the negative impact of PMR and the tax wedge. Macroeconomic variables are generally consistent with the major literature and do not change LMIs interpretation. Among macroeconomic factors, capital accumulation plays the most important role in reducing the unemployment rate. Finally, my findings suggest the implementation of economic policies consistent with Keynesian theory and all those economists—such as Solow (1990)—who look at the labor market as a social institution.