Incentive intensity, forbearance law and the governance of transactions
AbstractThis paper uses a simple make-or-buy model to summarize and illustrate some of the distinguishing aspects of Williamson's transaction cost theory. It is shown that each mode of governance is associated with a different degree of incentive intensity, which in turn is attributable to the difference in court access and in the control of accounts. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Industrial and Corporate Change.
Volume (Year): 13 (2004)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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- Oliver E. Williamson, 2005. "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 1-18, May.
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