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Strategy, Organization and Incentives: Global Corporate Banking at Citibank

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  • Baron, David P
  • Besanko, David

Abstract

This paper studies organizational structure and incentives within a company, Citibank, that has an explicit and evolving global business strategy. The paper focuses on Citibank's corporate banking business, which in the mid-1990s underwent major changes in its strategy that, in turn, were accompanied by two major reorganizations and implementation of a new incentive compensation system. Citibank's corporate banking business in OECD markets moved from a geography-based organization to one that was multi-dimensional, with the customer dimension given first priority, the product dimension given second priority, and the geography dimension significantly de-emphasized. Citibank thus represents an excellent setting for examining the interplay among strategy and organizational structure in a complex, global company. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Baron, David P & Besanko, David, 2001. "Strategy, Organization and Incentives: Global Corporate Banking at Citibank," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 10(1), pages 1-36, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:10:y:2001:i:1:p:1-36
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    Cited by:

    1. Ziss, Steffen, 2007. "Hierarchies, intra-firm competition and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 237-260, April.
    2. Schöttner, Anja & Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna, 2015. "Optimal Allocation of Decision-Making Authority and the Provision of Incentives under Uncertainty," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113200, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Oliver Dürr & Markus Nisch & Anna Rohlfing-Bastian, 2020. "Incentives in optimally sized teams for projects with uncertain returns," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 313-341, March.
    4. Viitamo, Esa, 2014. "Service productivity, technology and organization - Converting theory to praxis," ETLA Working Papers 26, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.

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