At the Movies: The Economics of Exhibition Contracts

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

At the Movies: The Economics of Exhibition Contracts

Author Info

Darren Filson
David Switzer
Portia Besocke

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Darren Filson

Abstract

We describe a real-world profit sharing contract--the movie exhibition contract--and consider alternative explanations for its use. Two explanations based on difficulties with forecasting fit the facts better than asymmetric information models. The first emphasizes two-sided risk aversion; the second emphasizes measurement costs. Transaction costs and long-term relationships also affect contractual practices. We use an original data set of all exhibition contracts involving 13 theaters owned by a prominent St. Louis exhibitor over a two-year period to inform our theories and test hypotheses. The findings question traditional contract theory and may be relevant for other contracting environments.(JEL L14, L82, D45, D80) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 354-369
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:2:p:354-369

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Email:
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Ch'ng, Kean Siang, 2007. "Evolutionary Concept, Genetic Algorithm and Exhibition Contract in Movie Industry," MPRA Paper 5138, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ch'ng, Kean Siang, 2007. "Evolutionary Concept, Genetic Algorithm and Exhibition Contract in Movie Industry," MPRA Paper 5387, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
Ricard Gil, 2006. "Renegotiation, Learning and Relational Contracting," CEI Working Paper Series 2005-14, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-24.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.