The author integrates constitutional constraints in a model of electoral control of politicians. Two types of politicians compete for office: angels, who never misuse power, and knaves, who abuse delegated power. Political theory suggests that constitutional constraints and elections are substitutes; the author finds a more complicated relationship. Elections sometimes substitute for constraints, while constraints complement and strengthen electoral controls based on politicians' payoffs. Elections must work perfectly to generally allow constraints to be dispensed with. Knaves might self-select out of politics with constitutional constraints, which consequently appear inconsistent with the observed character of politicians. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 36 (1998) Issue (Month): 4 (October) Pages: 670-78 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:36:y:1998:i:4:p:670-78
Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/