Redundant protection, tariffs that exceed the domestic import-price differential, is an important feature of nineteenth century U.S. tariff history and remains a common practice in many developing countries. This paper develops political-economy models of the tariff-setting process when the world price of the importable product is stochastic. The optimal endogenous tariff may involve redundant protection even if agents are risk neutral. These political-economy models also permit us to assess the comparative static effects of changes in the mean-preserving spread of the world price under differing assumptions about the political process. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.
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