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The Demand to Regulate Franchise Monopoly: Evidence from CATV Rate Deregulation in California

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  • Hazlett, Thomas W

Abstract

The motivation to price control a franchise monopoly is examined in the context of three distinct economic views of regulatory behavior. These views are tested against data from the California cable television market over the years 1980-85, during which a subset of monopoly firms converted from regulated to unregulated pricing for basic cable services. As the price constraints of regulation appear to be insignificant in a welfare analysis, the demand for such controls by municipalities is derived from their utility in enforcing vote-maximizing transfer schemes--a Peltzmanian political outcome with a Stiglerian economic welfare result. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 275-96

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:2:p:275-96

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Cited by:
  1. Yasuji Otsuka & Bradley Braun, 2002. "Taxation by Regulation and Regulation by Taxation: The Case of Local Cable TV Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 21-40, August.
  2. Francis Su, . "Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-10, Claremont Colleges.

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