The Hayek Hypothesis in Experimental Auctions: Institutional Effects and Market Power
AbstractThe authors report twelve market experiments utilizing a "seller market power" supply and demand structure where two of five sellers can unilaterally increase their profit by withholding supply. The data indicate that both the double auction and posted offer institutions result in traders extracting the bulk of the potential gains from exchange in the market; however, prices generally occur about the competitive equilibrium prediction. Market power, in the form of strategic supply withholding, does not appear to be responsible for the supracompetitive prices. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Omar Al-Ubaydli & Peter Boettke, 2012.
"Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental examination of the 'hayek hypothesis',"
Framed Field Experiments
00195, The Field Experiments Website.
- Omar Al-Ubaydli & Peter Boettke, 2011. "Markets as Economizers of Information: Field Experimental Examination of the "Hayek Hypothesis"," Working Papers 1025, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Al-Ubaydli, Omar & Boettke, Peter, 2010. "Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental examination of the “Hayek Hypothesis”," MPRA Paper 27660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:fee:wpaper:1201 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:wyi:wpaper:002051 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cason, Timothy N. & Datta, Shakun, 2006. "An experimental study of price dispersion in an optimal search model with advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 639-665, May.
- Lisa Posey & Abdullah Yavas, 2007.
"Screening equilibria in experimental markets,"
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,
Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 147-167, December.
- Elliott, Steven R. & Godby, Robert & Kruse, Jamie Brown, 2003. "An experimental examination of vertical control and cost predation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 253-281, February.
- Jay Corrigan, 2005.
"Is the Experimental Auction a Dynamic Market?,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(1), pages 35-45, 05.
- Timothy N. Cason & Shakun Datta, 2008. "Costly Buyer Search in Laboratory Markets with Seller Advertising," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1212, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Bradley Ruffle, 2006. "Buyer Concentration As A Source Of Countervailing Power: Evidence From Experimental Posted-Offer Markets," Departmental Working Papers 2006-12, McGill University, Department of Economics.
- Sherstyuk, Katerina, 2008.
"Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions,"
Handbook of Experimental Economics Results,
- Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002. "Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 200207, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Shachat, Jason & Zhang, Zhenxuan, 2012.
"The Hayek hypothesis and long run competitive equilibrium: an experimental investigation,"
39579, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.