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Expropriation of Multinational Firms: The Role of Domestic Market Conditions and Domestic Rivalries

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  • Mohtadi, Hamid

Abstract

The causes of expropriation of multinational firms by their host governments are investigated, based on social welfare analysis and also on public choice theory. A key feature is the presence of Cournot-Nash rivalry with domestic firms. Thus, the likelihood of expropriation differs according to whether or not a domestic rival exists. The likelihood also depends on the multinational firms' initial technological superiority over domestic technology, the host country's demand structure, the type of control to be exercised over the expropriated firm (private versus state), and the strategic behavior of the multinational firms, ex anti, when under threat of expropriation. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 28 (1990)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 813-30

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:28:y:1990:i:4:p:813-30

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Cited by:
  1. Tom G. Geurts & Austin J. Jaffe, 1996. "Risk and Real Estate Investment: An International Perspective," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 11(2), pages 117-130.
  2. Choi, Yongjae & Esfahani, Hadi Salehi, 1998. "Direct foreign investment and expropriation incentives: A mitigating role for match-specific capital," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 47-59.
  3. Andersson, Thomas & Brännäs, Kurt, 1991. "Explaining the Termination of Nationalizations in the Late 1970s," Working Paper Series 313, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  4. Andersson, Thomas & Brännäs, Kurt, 1992. "Nationalizations and Investment Flows: A Panel Study," Working Paper Series 330, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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