The causes of expropriation of multinational firms by their host governments are investigated, based on social welfare analysis and also on public choice theory. A key feature is the presence of Cournot-Nash rivalry with domestic firms. Thus, the likelihood of expropriation differs according to whether or not a domestic rival exists. The likelihood also depends on the multinational firms' initial technological superiority over domestic technology, the host country's demand structure, the type of control to be exercised over the expropriated firm (private versus state), and the strategic behavior of the multinational firms, ex anti, when under threat of expropriation. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 28 (1990) Issue (Month): 4 (October) Pages: 813-30 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:28:y:1990:i:4:p:813-30
Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)