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Lawmaking as an Endogenous Process

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  • Romain Espinosa

Abstract

Although democracy is today the most common form of government, the Law and Economics literature has neglected for a long time the role of social preferences in lawmaking. This article aims at capturing the endogenous process of lawmaking: in democracies, people partly determine the law they have to respect. To do so, I construct a theoretical model of lawmaking in democratic countries with three agents: the population, the legislator and the judge. The normative analysis focuses on systems that favor legal stability. The article concludes that the judge’s interpretation power should be higher in the case of sensitive legal fields. I use this framework to derive guidelines for policy-making in the field of copyright infringement. (JEL codes: D72, D78, D02, K00, K49)

Suggested Citation

  • Romain Espinosa, 2014. "Lawmaking as an Endogenous Process," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 60(3), pages 463-489.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:60:y:2014:i:3:p:463-489.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ift005
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other

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