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The Supply of Information in an Emotional Setting

Author

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  • Dionysius Glycopantis
  • Charitini Stavropoulou

Abstract

Advances in the field of economics and psychology have contributed greatly to the understanding of the supply of information when it affects the emotions and consequently the decisions made by two parties. Yet, these studies assume that the parties have identical utilities. In this article, focusing on the doctor--patient interaction, we relax the perfect agency assumption, introduce the agent's effort in supplying information, and analyze the two parties' interdependent decisions under asymmetric information. We show that when the supplier of information fails to understand the receiver's preferences the latter will disregard completely the recommendation. We consider the policy recommendations and welfare implications of the model. (JEL codes: C72, D8, I1) Copyright The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Dionysius Glycopantis & Charitini Stavropoulou, 2011. "The Supply of Information in an Emotional Setting," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 57(4), pages 740-762, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:57:y:2011:i:4:p:740-762
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifr024
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    Cited by:

    1. Dionysius Glycopantis & Charitini Stavropoulou, 2018. "An agency relationship under general conditions of uncertainty: a game theory application to the doctor–patient interaction," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(1), pages 15-28, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health

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