Nationally and Internationally Optimal Climate Policies: External Balances versus Environmental Preferences
AbstractThis article compares nationally optimal to internationally optimal (Pareto efficient) emission permit levels in a two-country overlapping generations model with national emission permit systems and the environment as a global public good. When each government maximizes its steady state economic and environmental welfare and one country is a net foreign creditor and the other one a net foreign debtor, it is nationally optimal for the creditor country with sufficiently high environmental preferences to chose a stricter permit level than the debtor country. However, the resulting Nash equilibrium permit levels are not Pareto efficient. Depending on the direction and strength of the countries' differences in external balances and environmental preferences, Pareto efficiency mandates that their permit levels are either adjusted in opposite directions or reduced in both. (JEL codes: F59; Q54; D62) Copyright The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: firstname.lastname@example.org, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by CESifo in its journal CESifo Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 57 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.