Stochastic Fertility, Moral Hazard, and the Design of Pay-As-You-Go Pension Plans
AbstractThis article models a two-period overlapping generations economy in the steady state where the realization of the quantity-quality number of children depends on an initial investment in children and on a random shock. It shows that the implementation of the first-best allocation, in which the effort level is publicly observable, requires a subsidy on the investment in children. There should also be full insurance with respect to second-period consumption and pensions must be invariant to the number of children. On the other hand, when investment is unobservable and one cannot subsidize it, the full insurance property goes away. In this case, pensions must be linked positively to the number of children. (JEL codes: H55, J13) Copyright The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: firstname.lastname@example.org, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by CESifo in its journal CESifo Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 57 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- CREMER, Helmuth & GAHVARI, Firouz & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Stochastic fertility, moral hazard, and the design of pay-as-you-go pension plans," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2324, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Pierre Pestieau, 2003. "Stochastic fertility, moral hazard, and the design of pay-as-you-go pension plans," DELTA Working Papers 2003-21, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006.
"Pensions with Endogenous and Stochastic Fertility,"
Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre & GAHVARI, Firouz, 2004. "Pensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility," CORE Discussion Papers 2004067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- CREMER, Helmuth & GAHVARI, Firouz & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Pensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1928, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Pensions with Endogenous and Stochastic Fertility," IDEI Working Papers 305, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.