Keynes on Mathematics: Philosophical Foundations and Economic Applications
AbstractJohn Maynard Keynes's position on the role of mathematics and statistics in economics is quite sophisticated and differs markedly from the conventional view of preponderant hostility to the use of these methods. It is based on the twin proposition that formal methods have positive roles to play, but constrained domains of application. Keynes's hostility was aroused not by mathematics itself, but by pseudo-mathematics, or the failure to respect the nature and applicability of formal methods. Underlying Keynes's views is his distinctive philosophical framework, and the principle that logic (or philosophy) should precede and supervise the application of mathematics. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Cambridge Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 14 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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- J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., 2001. "Alternative Keynesian and Post Keynesian Perspectives on Uncertainty and Expectations," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 23(4), pages 545-566, July.
- Muchlinski, Elke, 2011. "Die Rezeption der John Maynard Keynes Manuskripte von 1904 bis 1911. Anregungen für die deutschsprachige Diskussion," Discussion Papers 2011/7, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
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