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The Effect of Mandatory Insurer Reporting on Settlement Delay

Author

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  • Paul Heaton

Abstract

To improve their fiscal position, Medicare and some state Medicaid programs have recently taken steps to mandate reporting of personal injury awards and thus facilitate subrogation against such awards. Participants in the tort system have argued these additional reporting requirements might delay settlement of claims, harming both plaintiffs and defendants. This article examines this problem empirically, using a rich, national data set of closed automobile bodily injury claims. Using a differences-in-differences research design that exploits the introduction of a new Medicare reporting requirement in 2011, it demonstrates that mandated reporting increased time to settlement by 19%, or an average of 58 days. Robustness checks using data from closed malpractice claims reveal a similar delay. Conservative calculations suggest such delays could generate hundreds of millions of dollars in waiting costs each year. Policymakers should be aware of and seek to avoid such costs as they assess whether and how to expand reporting of personal injury awards.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Heaton, 2020. "The Effect of Mandatory Insurer Reporting on Settlement Delay," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 397-433.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:22:y:2020:i:2:p:397-433.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahaa010
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    K13; K23; K41; I13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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