IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ajagec/v76y1994i3p547-556..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Technology Transfer, Licensing Contracts, and Incentives for Further Innovation

Author

Listed:
  • Bruce A. Larson
  • Margot Anderson

Abstract

Technology licensing is common in agricultural and natural resource sectors. An important characteristic of technology licenses is that they provide incentives for further innovation on the part of the buyer. This paper develops a risk-sharing model to analyze how risk preferences and expectations about further innovation possibilities alter technology payments and the incentives for complementary local innovation. Higher buyer risk aversion, which is associated with lower fixed payments, reduces the technology buyer's level of innovation. Sellers are generally better off when innovation is anticipated, but buyers are generally better off when innovation is unanticipated, although less innovation may be realized.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce A. Larson & Margot Anderson, 1994. "Technology Transfer, Licensing Contracts, and Incentives for Further Innovation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(3), pages 547-556.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:76:y:1994:i:3:p:547-556.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1243665
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ka Wai Terence Fung & Chi Keung Marco Lau & Kwok Ho Chan, 2016. "An R&D-based real business cycle model," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(4), pages 327-358, December.
    2. Lee Davis, 2006. "Licensing Strategies of the Enterprising - but Vulnerable - "Intellectual Property" Vendors," DRUID Working Papers 06-12, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:76:y:1994:i:3:p:547-556.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.