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The Abuse Of Dominant Position - Restricting Competition Practice. Case Study: Eni

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  • BERINDE Mihai

    (Department of International Business, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania,)

  • FORA Andreea-Florina

    (Department of International Business, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania,)

Abstract

The abuse of dominant position along with cartel, merger and state aid are practices restricting competition strictly regulated at EU level. These practices can have a disastrous effect on the internal market harming both competition especially consumers. These practices can have a disastrous effect on the domestic market harming both competition and especially consumers. This paper aims to analyze how the abuse of a dominant position is regulated in the European Union. The research methodology used is the study of literature, analysis of legislation, case study, and the collection and interpretation of statistical data. The Competition Law at European level is harmonized among European Union member states. The competition authorities of the EU Member States work together to detect and sanction the practice that is restrictive for competition. Improving legislation that regulates the abuse of dominant position has been an ongoing concern of competition authorities, which is why the EU currently enjoys a very well established procedure. The procedure governing the abuse of dominant position consists of a series of steps that must be taken gradually to have the desired result, i.e. restoring fair competition on a given market. The case study presented in this paper is indicative and shows very clearly the next steps for referral to an abuse of dominant position, with special reference to the outcome arising when applying the procedure correctly. The analysis of statistical data regarding the number of investigations opened and the number of decisions made by competition authorities on abuse of dominant position is relevant, outlining the evolution of the work performed by competition authorities. Throughout the period of ten years analyzed (January 2004 - February 2013) there were 1583 cases of violation of antitrust laws at European level. The percentage of investigations opened by the competition authorities of the Member States is 86%, much higher than the number of investigations opened by the European Commission (14%). Both the activity of the competition authorities and especially the importance of competition policy as well as the guardian position for consumer protection assumed by the Competition Council in each Member State of the European Union have to be underlined.

Suggested Citation

  • BERINDE Mihai & FORA Andreea-Florina, 2013. "The Abuse Of Dominant Position - Restricting Competition Practice. Case Study: Eni," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 54-63, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2013:i:1:p:54-63
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    File URL: http://anale.steconomiceuoradea.ro/volume/2013/n1/005.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kohutek, Konrad, 2010. "Impact of the New Approach to Article 102 TFEU on the Enforcement of the Polish Prohibition of Dominant Position Abuse," MPRA Paper 32647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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      Keywords

      abuse of dominant position; competition policy; European legislation; procedure; case study;
      All these keywords.

      JEL classification:

      • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
      • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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