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Why Do Firms Go Public Through Debt Instead of Equity?

Author

Listed:
  • Glushkov, Denys
  • Khorana, Ajay
  • Rau, P. Raghavendra
  • Zhang, Jingxuan

Abstract

We analyze a sample of private firms that go public through an initial public debt offering (IPDO) as an alternative to going public through equity (initial public offering [IPO]). Firms that choose the IPDO route are larger, more likely to be backed by a financial sponsor such as a venture capital or private equity firm, and less likely to face information asymmetry than traditional IPO firms. Only a quarter of these firms eventually conduct an IPO, but those who do face lower underpricing than their contemporaneous private peers who do not have public debt at the time of going public.

Suggested Citation

  • Glushkov, Denys & Khorana, Ajay & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Zhang, Jingxuan, 2018. "Why Do Firms Go Public Through Debt Instead of Equity?," Critical Finance Review, now publishers, vol. 7(1), pages 85-110, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jnlcfr:104.00000057
    DOI: 10.1561/104.00000057
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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Deloof & Abe Jong & Wilco Legierse, 2023. "Going public: evidence from stock and bond IPOs in Belgium, 1839–1935," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 17(3), pages 433-466, September.
    2. Robert Prilmeier & René M. Stulz, 2019. "Securities Laws, Bank Monitoring, and the Choice Between Cov-lite Loans and Bonds for Highly Levered," NBER Working Papers 25467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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