Endogenous Market Institutions: Experimental Evidence
AbstractA wide variety of market institutions exist in the field and on the Internet. Examples are English auctions and two-sided marketplaces like the double auction where both buyers and sellers initiate prices. This paper investigates how the emergence of (different) market institutions is shaped by buyers’ and sellers’ institutional preferences. The experimental evidence reveals that both buyers and sellers in the main prefer market institutions that restrict the ability to make price offers to their side of the market. However, when buyers and sellers are allowed to express both first and second choices, the double auction emerges as the most viable market institution.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 30 (2004)
Issue (Month): ()
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Market institutions; institutional preferences; voting rules; experimental economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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