Prospettive di federalismo fiscale in Italia tra modifica del Titolo V e legge delega sulla riforma fiscale
AbstractThe recent project of fiscal reform in Italy has been presented by Minister Tremonti at the end of 2001 without taking into the due account the contemporary constitutional reform of fiscal federalism (L. n. 3 del 18/10/2001, arts. 117-118 and 119). From the theory of political economy perspective, this institutional procedure has showed an explicit contradiction with respect to the traditional link between financial decisions taken at constitutional level, by a large structural majority in a cooperative setting, and the financial decisions taken at post-constitutional level by a specific occasional majority in a non-cooperative setting. In particular, the fiscal reform, aimed to support the tax-reduction to firms and the fiscal incentive for capital accumulation and growth, is going to produce many troubles for the already complicated fiscal federalism evolution in Italy. In this note we consider the main implications for the public finance of Italian Regions of some measures the fiscal reform (reduction and gradual abolition of IRAP and reduction of IRPEF tax-rates), giving some evidence with reference to Toscana and Provincia Autonoma di Trento.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Società editrice il Mulino in its journal Politica economica.
Volume (Year): (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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