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Cartel Conduct and Antitrust Compliance with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk

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  • Johannes Paha

Abstract

This article models antitrust compliance training as a form of information acquisition. It finds that lower fines may benefit consumers by improving the deterrence of cartels: Sales managers who underestimate the severity of antitrust enforcement sometimes establish cartels that are actually unprofitable for their firms. This risk rises if an antitrust authority lowers the sanctions imposed on anticompetitive conduct. Therefore, it is a best response for firms' compliance officers to establish antitrust training programs to mitigate this risk and prevent cartels. Fines must however not be reduced so strongly as to make anticompetitive collusion profitable.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Paha, 2018. "Cartel Conduct and Antitrust Compliance with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 174(3), pages 448-475, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201809)174:3_448:ccaacw_2.0.tx_2-v
    DOI: 10.1628/093245617X14996661407776
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    collusion; compliance; enforcement risk; imperfect information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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