Endogenous Imitation and Implications for Technology Policy
AbstractWe present a theory of socially valuable imitation in a model exhibiting strategic interaction between innovating and imitating firms. Allowing for endogenous imitation calls for substantial revisions of technology policy. There will be underinvestment in imitation from a social point of view when imitation leads to competition which is sufficiently intense. For example, with Cournot competition this holds in industries facing sharply decreasing returns or sufficiently price-sensitive demand; it does not hold in industries operating under constant returns. In the former case, it is socially optimal to subsidize not only innovation but also imitation, though at different rates. Rationally determined imitation makes socially optimal patents longer than suggested by earlier models with non-strategic imitation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 156 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
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- Ben Youssef, Slim & Breton, Michèle & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Cooperating firms in inventive and absorptive research," MPRA Paper 35326, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tapio Palokangas, 2009. "Optimal Patent Length and Patent Width for an Economy with Creative Destruction and Non-Diversifiable Risk," DEGIT Conference Papers c014_024, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Lars Wiethaus, 2006. "Cooperation or competition in R&D when innovation and absorption are costly," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(6), pages 569-589.
- Tapio Palokangas, 2011. "Optimal patent length and breadth in an economy with creative destruction and non-diversifiable risk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(1), pages 1-27, January.
- Tapio Palokangas, 2006. "Competition, Imitation and Growth with Non-Diversifiable Risk," DEGIT Conference Papers c011_036, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Rune Stenbacka, 2002. "Microeconomic Policies in the New Economy," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 59-75, Autumn.
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