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Endogenous Imitation and Implications for Technology Policy

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Author Info

  • Vesa Kanniainen
  • Rune Stenbacka

Abstract

We present a theory of socially valuable imitation in a model exhibiting strategic interaction between innovating and imitating firms. Allowing for endogenous imitation calls for substantial revisions of technology policy. There will be underinvestment in imitation from a social point of view when imitation leads to competition which is sufficiently intense. For example, with Cournot competition this holds in industries facing sharply decreasing returns or sufficiently price-sensitive demand; it does not hold in industries operating under constant returns. In the former case, it is socially optimal to subsidize not only innovation but also imitation, though at different rates. Rationally determined imitation makes socially optimal patents longer than suggested by earlier models with non-strategic imitation.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 156 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 360-

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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200006)156:2_360:eiaift_2.0.tx_2-f

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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite

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Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
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Cited by:
  1. Katz, Michael L., 2013. "Provider competition and healthcare quality: More bang for the buck?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 612-625.
  2. Tapio Palokangas, 2006. "Competition, Imitation and Growth with Non-Diversifiable Risk," DEGIT Conference Papers c011_036, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
  3. Lars Wiethaus, 2006. "Cooperation or competition in R&D when innovation and absorption are costly," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(6), pages 569-589.
  4. Rune Stenbacka, 2002. "Microeconomic Policies in the New Economy," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 59-75, Autumn.
  5. Tapio Palokangas, 2009. "Optimal Patent Length and Patent Width for an Economy with Creative Destruction and Non-Diversifiable Risk," DEGIT Conference Papers c014_024, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
  6. Tapio Palokangas, 2011. "Optimal patent length and breadth in an economy with creative destruction and non-diversifiable risk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(1), pages 1-27, January.
  7. Ben Youssef, Slim & Breton, Michèle & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Cooperating firms in inventive and absorptive research," MPRA Paper 35326, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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