IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urndoi10.1628-jite-2022-0017.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do Higher Public Wages Reduce Corruption? The Force of Redistributive Norms

Author

Listed:
  • Rein Haagsma

Abstract

A setting is examined where private citizens and public officials interact in pairs for a public service with the option to engage in bribery. Both sides may face a personal moral cost in the event of bribery, while officials also have to deal with redistributive pressures from their kinship network. Over time, the distributions of moral costs among citizens and officials may adjust in response to the incidence of corruption, and this also impacts sharing obligations. Two types of stable long-run equilibria with persistent corruption can arise: one type can be associated with an individualistic society, the other with a collectivist society.

Suggested Citation

  • Rein Haagsma, 2022. "Do Higher Public Wages Reduce Corruption? The Force of Redistributive Norms," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 178(4), pages 353-384.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2022-0017
    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2022-0017
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/do-higher-public-wages-reduce-corruption-the-force-of-redistributive-norms-101628jite-2022-0017
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1628/jite-2022-0017?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; publicwages; extendedfamily; sharingnorms; collectivism; individualism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2022-0017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/jite .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.