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On the Importance of Relative Payoffs in Two-Sided Matching

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  • Ernan Haruvy

Abstract

In a series of laboratory experiments, small groups of individuals who find themselves in an unequal pairwise-stable outcome tacitly form coalitions on one sideof the market to protect or reject that outcome. The contribution of this work isin showing that relative payoffs play a role in two-sided matching markets; thatin the lab, a same-side blocking coalition can form; and that the matching prescribed by deferred acceptance, by virtue of being highly asymmetric, may not survive same-side blocking coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernan Haruvy, 2019. "On the Importance of Relative Payoffs in Two-Sided Matching," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 175(1), pages 58-85.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2019-0026
    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0026
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    Cited by:

    1. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    market design; matching theory; laboratory experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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