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Do Monopolies Justifiably Fear Environmental Tax Reforms?

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Author Info
Thorsten Bayíndír-Upmann
Abstract

It is often argued that without tax-exemptions for the production sector environmental tax reforms substantially reduce profits and endanger employment. We challenge this view and investigate the consequences of both a small and alarge tax reform in the case of a monopoly. We show that these suspected effects are unlikely to emerge. Rather the contrary, for a wide range of ex ante tax systems, profits and employ-ment of non-polluting factors increase - and, in this sense, together with a positive environmental effect, a double, or evena triple dividend can often be attained. What we should, however, be concerned about is the effect of a green tax reform on the demand for environmentally harmful factors of production. When the double dividend fails, it frequently does so because the environmental dividend is lost.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.

Volume (Year): 57 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 459-
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200108)57:4_459:dmjfet_2.0.tx_2-e

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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/fa

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Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
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Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

Cited by:
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  1. Requate, Till, 2005. "Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition : A Survey," Economics Working Papers 2005,12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-27.


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