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The Theory of Institutional Change Revisited: The Institutional Dichotomy, Its Dynamic, and Its Policy Implications in a More Formal Analysis

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  • Wolfram Elsner
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    Abstract

    The Theory of Institutional Change as elaborated by P.D. Bush in the tradition of Veblen, Ayres and J.F. Foster provided an important device for analysis, with its clarification of the value bases and of forms and dynamics of value-behavior patterns. Bush pushed institutionalism to a certain limit. Coming from different "galaxies," formal approaches, such as system dynamics, network analysis, graph theory, or game theory have been further developed by institutional and evolutionary economists in order to close gaps and to further operationalize, formalize, and develop institutionalism. This paper strives to demonstrate that we can bridge gaps between the theory of institutional change and an evolutionary-institutional interpretation of game theory. This allows for a deeper analysis of institutions , the value base in game theory, the instrumental-ceremonial asymmetry, ceremonial dominance and encapsulation , and the institutionalist policy conception. So, it is part of a broader project for the extension of institutionalism's reach.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by M.E. Sharpe, Inc. in its journal Journal of Economic Issues.

    Volume (Year): 46 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 1-44

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    Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:46:y:2012:i:1:p:1-44

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    Web page: http://www.mesharpe.com/mall/results1.asp?acr=jei

    Related research

    Keywords: ceremonial encapsulation; evolutionary-institutional game theory; institutional change; institutional dichotomy; institutions;

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    Cited by:
    1. Elsner, Wolfram & Schwardt, Henning, 2012. "Trust and Arena Size. Expectations, Trust, and Institutions Co-Evolving, and Their Critical Population and Group Sizes," MPRA Paper 40393, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Torsten Heinrich & Henning Schwardt, 2013. "Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 398-425, August.
    3. Gräbner, Claudius, 2014. "Agent-Based Computational Models - A Formal Heuristic for Institutionalist Pattern Modelling?," MPRA Paper 56415, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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