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(Deceptive) Status Seeking Strategies in France and Tunisia

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  • Insaf Bekir
  • Sana El Harbi
  • Gilles Grolleau

Abstract

We contend that consumption of a given status conveying good frequently follows a Kuznets-like curve. Concretely, the consumption of a given status marker first increases with the level of income per capita, reaches a maximum and then decreases at higher levels of income. Moreover, globalization has led to a greater homogenization of status markers across societies. Given severe budget constraints in developing countries and lax enforcement of intellectual property rights, we contend that people are more likely to use deceptive status signaling strategies with a strong desire to keep up with the "Joneses" located in developed countries. We investigate empirically what strategies are used in Tunisia and France to satisfy some status needs. Using survey data in Tunisia and France, we show that Tunisian students are more likely to adopt deceptive status signals by consuming fakes compared to French students. We also identify in each context the determinants of purchase intention of genuine status conferring goods. We emphasize some policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Insaf Bekir & Sana El Harbi & Gilles Grolleau, 2011. "(Deceptive) Status Seeking Strategies in France and Tunisia," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 717-732.
  • Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:45:y:2011:i:3:p:717-732
    DOI: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450311
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    Cited by:

    1. Grolleau Gilles & Marciano Alain & Mzoughi Naoufel, 2018. "How Status Seeking may Prevent Coasean Bargaining," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-20, July.
    2. Armando Memushi, 2014. "Conspicuous Consumption and Albanians: Determinant Factors," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 12(1), pages 65-87.

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