This paper analyzes rent-seeking behavior in trade policy based on the Grossman-Helpman (1994) framework. Our empirical implementation deals with Polish trade policy in the late 1990s. We use the instrumental variable approach to estimate the model, accounting for possible endogeneity of the regressors. Our results suggest that lobbies were important in the process of Polish trade policy formation in the period under consideration. The degree of the lobbies' influence is, however, significantly lower than in the case of the United States. The model seems to perform better for most-favored-nation cases than preferential tariffs. In the former case, our estimates are in line with the original theory.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 46 (2008) Issue (Month): 5 (September) Pages: 27-46 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF