Asymmetric Information and Loan Contracts in a Neoclassical Growth Model
AbstractThe authors consider a neoclassical growth model with risky investment projects in which a borrower's (an investor's) risk type is private information. Their innovation is to determine jointly the equilibrium loan contract and the economy's growth path and the steady state capital stock. The authors show that as capital accumulates, credit rationing may fall as an increasing number of lenders choose to acquire costly information to separate borrowers as to type. This transition from credit rationing to screening in turn results in a higher capital accumulation path and a higher steady state capital stock. They also investigate the effects of a decrease in the cost of information on the economy's capital accumulation path and steady state capital stock. The authors show that the cost of information must fall below a threshold level before the economy moves from a credit rationing equilibrium to a screening one. Thus a threshold must be crossed before the steady state capital stock is increased with a decrease in the cost of information. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Volume (Year): 29 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879
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