State-Contingent Inflation Contracts and Unemployment Persistence
Abstract
This paper shows that, if unemployment (or some other real variable) follows a dynamic autoregressive process, the government can still achieve its precommitment outcome in monetary policy by offering the central banker a linear inflation contract, where the penalty for incremental inflation depends positively on lagged unemployment. This note, therefore, offers an extension of recent results of C. Walsh (1995) to the case of persistence in real economic variables such as output or unemployment. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Volume (Year): 29 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 286-99
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008.
"Reelection threshold contracts in politics,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August.
- Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2005. "Re-election Threshold Contracts in Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 5175, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2001. "Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 622, CESifo Group Munich.
- Castrén, Olli & Takalo , Tuomas & Wood , Geoffrey, 2004.
"Labour market reform and the sustainability of exchange rate pegs,"
Research Discussion Papers
22/2004, Bank of Finland.
- Olli Castrén & Tuomas Takalo & Geoffrey Wood, 2004. "Labour market reform and the sustainability of exchange rate pegs," Working Paper Series 406, European Central Bank.
- Mash, Richard, 2002.
"Monetary Policy with an Endogenous Capital Stock When Inflation Is Persistent,"
Manchester School,
University of Manchester, vol. 70(0), pages 55-86, Supplemen.
- Richard Mash, 2002. "Monetary Policy with an Endogenous Capital Stock when Inflation is Persistent," Economics Series Working Papers 108, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Leitemo,K., 1999. "Inflation targeting strategies in small open economies," Memorandum 21/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- repec:oxf:wpaper:015 is not listed on IDEAS
- Anssi Rantala, 2004. "Adaptive learning and multiple equilibria in a natural rate monetary model with unemployment persistence," GE, Growth, Math methods 0404005, EconWPA.
- Henrik Jensen & Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, 1999.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 342-347, March.
- Roel M.W.J. Beetsma & Henrik Jensen, . "Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative” Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-11, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "Inflation, Income Redistribution, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0102, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Richard Mash, 2000. "The Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy with Inflation Persistence," Economics Series Working Papers 15, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2003.
"A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence,"
IMF Working Papers
03/144, International Monetary Fund.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2010. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 647-677, 06.
- Edward Kutsoati, 2000. "Debt-Contingent Inflation Contracts and Targeting," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0009, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Hans Gersbach, 2004.
"Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections,"
Public Choice,
Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 157-177, October.
- Hans Gersbach, 2001. "Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections," CESifo Working Paper Series 406, CESifo Group Munich.
- Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0502, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "Deus ex machina wanted: time inconsistency of time consistency solutions in monetary policy," Economics Papers 2005-W10, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Rantala, Anssi, 2003. "Adaptive learning and multiple equilibria in a natural rate monetary model with unemployment persistence," Research Discussion Papers 30/2003, Bank of Finland.
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