Bank Entry during the Antebellum Period
AbstractA recent study by Kenneth Ng (1988) challenges the view the free banking laws lowered barriers to entry. The authors' study examines bank entry and capital formation in free and nonfree banking states during the free banking period. A competitive model is developed and used to test if barriers were lowered in free banking states. The evidence indicates that entry significantly increased after the enactment of the free banking laws and that entry policy in nonfree banking states appeared to have been 'liberalized' when the free banking laws were enacted in other states. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Volume (Year): 27 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879
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