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An Empirical Test of the Incentive Effects of Deposit Insurance: The Case of Junk Bonds at Savings and Loan Associations

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Author Info
Brewer, Elijah, III
Mondschean, Thomas H
Abstract

This paper analyzes how financial markets reacted to S&L diversification into junk bonds. The authors report that junk bond holdings are positively correlated with both the volatility of S&L equity returns and the interest rates paid on large CDs. Next, they examine the impact of junk bonds on equity returns. For poorly capitalized S&Ls, greater risk taking increases the value of deposit insurance and should lead to higher stock returns. However, a well-capitalized institution that increases junk bond holdings should not experience stock price gains. The authors find that this is the case for the sample of S&Ls they studied. Copyright 1994 by Ohio State University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 26 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 146-64
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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:26:y:1994:i:1:p:146-64

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

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  1. Sangkyun Park & Stavros Peristiani, 2001. "Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?," Staff Reports 138, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alexei Karas & William Pyle & Koen Schoors, 2006. "Sophisticated Discipline in Nascent Deposit Markets: Evidence from Post-Communist Russia," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0607, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Elijah Brewer III & Thomas H. Mondschean & Philip Strahan, 1996. "The Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-15, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  4. Reint Gropp & Jukka Vesala, 2004. "Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring," Working Paper Series 302, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  5. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2006. "Can feedback from the jumbo CD market improve bank surveillance?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 135-175. [Downloadable!]
  6. Linda M. Hooks & Kenneth J. Robinson, 1996. "Moral hazard and Texas banking in the 1920s," Financial Industry Studies Working Paper 96-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  7. Douglas Evanoff & Lewis Segal, 1997. "Strategic Responses to Bank Regulation: Evidence From HMDA Data," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-93, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Karas, Alexei & Pyle, William & Schoors, Koen, 2006. "Sophisticated discipline in a nascent deposit market: Evidence from post-communist Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 13/2006, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. R. Alton Gilbert & Andrew P. Meyer & Mark D. Vaughan, 2003. "Can feedback from the jumbo-CD market improve bank surveillance?," Working Papers 2003-041, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
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