Collateral as Signal Variable in a Business Partnership Contract: A Case Study of Refah Kargaran Bank (in Persian)

There is no convergence in the results of the credit relationship between the financial contracting parties (banks and customers) due to the different importance of the contract variables. Therefore, while examining the impact of the empirical relationship between the variables commercial profit-loss sharing contracts, the dual role of the collateral variable (screening and motivation) is investigated. The statistical population of Bank Rafah Kargaran contracts and the statistical sample of data items during period 1383-1393 were used for estimation by purposeful sampling method of multiple logit template. Hypothesis: Low-risk facilitators opted for more liquidity collateral, confirming the existence of an adverse selection phenomenon. Accordingly, individuals are willing to provide the bank with the quality and degree of risk to the bank through the type of collateral (deposit, property, combination, and contract) and the other hypothesis; To help with the collateral, this effect was accepted only for the profit rate variable. However, the model was not validated for the significant underlying variables. Therefore, coordination in the interactive relationships between financial contract variables to mitigate the consequences of asymmetric information in bankschr('39') credit policy to improve contract profitability is inevitable.