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Ein Schuldenerlass als Ende mit Schrecken?: – Das ESZB als Kreditgeber der letzten Instanz für Staaten –

Author

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  • Hansen Arne

    (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität – Universität der Bundeswehr HamburgInstitut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Lehrstuhl für OrdnungsökonomikHamburgDeutschland)

  • Meyer Dirk

    (Helmut-Schmidt-Universität – Universität der Bundeswehr HamburgInstitut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Lehrstuhl für OrdnungsökonomikHamburgDeutschland)

Abstract

The rising debt-to-GDP ratios of the eurozone member states result not least from the coronavirus crisis. Without external support, especially with regard to Italy, but also for other Mediterranean states, access to the capital market could be seriously threatened in the medium run. The recovery fund ‘Next Generation EU’ likely directs the fundamental structures of the European Union (EU) towards a fiscal union with considerable transfer elements, while the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), which is declared as a monetary policy instrument, is even discussed as a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing. As an alternative, this contribution analyses a debt relief by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), implemented via an EU debt agency. This construction would avoid a negative equity position of the central banks and also enable a legal integration into the EU system. The question remains: What would be the consequences of such a non-recurring step?

Suggested Citation

  • Hansen Arne & Meyer Dirk, 2020. "Ein Schuldenerlass als Ende mit Schrecken?: – Das ESZB als Kreditgeber der letzten Instanz für Staaten –," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 69(3), pages 277-307, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:69:y:2020:i:3:p:277-307:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2020-2039
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arne Hansen & Dirk Meyer, 2020. "The PSPP Government Bond Program – Empirical Data and Regulations Partially Question the Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 73(10), pages 37-46, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asset Purchase Programme (APP); Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme (PSPP); Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP); Recovery Fund ‘Next Generation EU’; Monetary Union; Monetary Financing; Debt Relief; Modern Monetary Theory (MMT); Anleihekaufprogramme (APP); Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme (PSPP); Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP); Wiederaufbaufonds ‚Next Generation EU‘; Währungsunion; monetäre Staatsfinanzierung; Schuldenerlass; Modern Monetary Theory (MMT);
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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