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Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices: An Economic Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Bartholomae Florian

    (Universität der Bundeswehr München, Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39, 85577 Neubiberg)

  • Morasch Karl

    (Universität der Bundeswehr München, Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39, 85577 Neubiberg)

Abstract

Die Ölpreisbindung des Erdgaspreises ist ein hervorstechendes Merkmal des Gasmarktes in Deutschland und anderen europäischen Ländern. Diese Besonderheit ist eng verknüpft mit der Existenz lokaler Monopole (trotz Liberalisierung bestehen diese bislang zumindest in Deutschland de facto weiterhin) und sogenannter „take-or-pay” Verträge (TOP contracts), d. h. fixer Abnahmeverpflichtungen zu einem an die Entwicklung des Ölpreises gekoppelten Abnahmepreis. Nach einer Diskussion der Beziehung zwischen diesen drei Besonderheiten des Erdgasmarktes und der möglichen Gründe für die Ölpreisbindung analysieren wir diese Strategie in einem Oligopolmodell mit differenzierten Produkten mit einem monopolistischen Erdgasanbieter und einem oder mehreren konkurrierenden Ölhändlern. Zunächst zeigen wir im Rahmen einer symmetrischen Spezifikation auf, wie die Ölpreisbindung die Kollusion zwischen Erdgas- und Ölanbietern ermöglicht. Anschließend berücksichtigen wir mögliche Asymmetrien zwischen den beiden Energieformen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass das Ergebnis bei Symmetrie nicht robust ist und wir diskutieren im Detail wie die Auswirkung der Ölpreisbindung auf Preise, Gewinne und Wohlfahrt von der Art und vom Ausmaß der Asymmetrien abhängt.

Suggested Citation

  • Bartholomae Florian & Morasch Karl, 2007. "Oil Price Indexing Of Natural Gas Prices: An Economic Analysis," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 58(3), pages 250-264, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:lus:reveco:v:58:y:2007:i:3:p:250-264
    DOI: 10.1515/roe-2007-0303
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    Cited by:

    1. Sell, Friedrich L., 2007. "More about economic and non-economic determinants of (mutual) trust and trustworthiness," Working Papers in Economics 2007,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L59 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Other

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