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Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players

Author

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  • Sang Chul Suh

    (University of Windsor)

Abstract

In a division problem, where a finite number of agents own a finite number of goods to share, we are interested in implementing equitable and efficient solutions. We propose mechanisms which doubly implement the solutions in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. The mechanisms we propose are simple in the sense that they do not require each agent to report a list of preferencaes Each agent only reports a consumption bun-dle, a price vector, a unit vector, and an integer.

Suggested Citation

  • Sang Chul Suh, 1997. "Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 39-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-199712-13-2-03
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implementation; Nash equilibrium; Strong Nash equilibrium; No-envy; Efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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